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Hardman: The Changing Law of Competition on Public Service

WEST VIRGINIA

LAW QUARTERLY
and THE BAR
VOLUME XXXII

APRIL, 1927

NUMBER 3

THE CHANGING LAW OF COMPETITION IN
PUBLIC SERVICE
THOMAS

P. HARDMAN*

Until very recently it could be said with much assurance
that American law favors free competition in practically all
businesses, including public utilities.' For example, a public utility could not, in general, prevent a rival utility from
competing and thereby absorbing the other's business.2 The
theory was that the various interests (i.e., human wants,
claims or desires) involved in such cases would be best
secured by curbing monopoly and encouraging competition.3 Thus, in a comparatively recent case, the West
* Professor of Law, West Virginia University.
In England the attitude toward monopoly and competition has been somewhat
different. In 1861 an English judge said in a leading case: "It is a mistaken notion
that the public is benefitted by pitting two railway companies against each other till
one is ruined, the result being, at last, to raise the fares to the highest possible
standard." Vice-Chancellor Wood, in Hare v. London etc. By. Co., 2 Johns. & H. 80,
108. As to the general English attitude toward monopoly, see Simpson, "How Far Does
the Law of England Forbid Monopoly," 41 L. QuAR. REv. 393 (1925).
In medieval times it appears that "a regulated monopoly with the corresponding
obligation of public service seemed * * * * * to the great majority of people far better
than an unregulated competition without public obligation." See 1 WYMAN, PUBLIC
SERvIcE ConPoRATIoNs §2 (1911).
See, e.g., Clarksburg Electric Light Co. v. City of Clarksburg et al., 47 W. Va.
739, 35 S. E. 994 (1900), discussed in this article. The court considered the question from
another angle. See also United Railroads of San Francisco v' City and County of San
Francisco, 249 U. S. 517 (1919). The latter decision is due in part to state constitutional provision, but is a good illustration of the policy of free competition. Cf. Charles
River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. (U. S.) 420 (1837). Of course, statutes
sometimes protected public utilities against competition. See The Binghampton Bridge,
3 Wall. (U. S.) 51 (1865). See also Acts of West Virginia 1882, c. 159, as to ferries
and tollbridges, and Mason v. Harper's Ferry Bridge Co., 17 W. Va. 396 (1880).
9 Of course, the cases did not generally express it thus. A leading West Virginia
case is West Virginia Transportation Co. v. Ohio River Pipe Line Co., 22 W. Va. 60D
(1883). See 3 WILLisTON, CONTRACTS §1651 (1920).
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Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, rigidly upholding this
theory, said :4
"The common law condemns, as against public policy,
agreements between public service corporations, of a
character to prevent free competition in the interest of
The courts have always condemned
the public * ** * *.
6
They must conmonopolies when brought before them.
'Competition is the life of
tinue to do so * * * * *
trade.' "8
A few decades ago this doctrine could be justified, to a
considerable extent at least, both in theory and by results.
For some time public opinion had favored the principle of
laissez faire.7 It was thought that the most desirable thing

was the least possible governmental

interference

with

business relations. The legal regulation of public utilities
did not adequately guard against the evils of monopoly.

Therefore, since "every opinion tends to become a law,"
as Mr. Justice Holmes tells us,8 the law favored free compe-

tition.

But today public opinion no longer looks with

special favor on laissez faire. We see the advantages in a

regulated monopoly.

We realize more fully that when

the interests of society, the social group, conflict with the

interests of the individual, the interests of society are, as a
rule, more important than the interests of the individual.
And we are, in general, effectively regulating against the
evils of monopoly in public service. Accordingly the law,
tending to crystallize public opinion and to meet changing

conditions, is tending to emphasize the interests of society
rather than the interests of individuals, and, to the extent

that such social interests outweigh the individual interests,

9
to sacrifice the individual interests, particularly the indi-

vidual interests of public utilities.
" Charleston Gas Co. v. Kanawha Gas Co., 58 W. Va. 22, 50 S. E. 876 (1006). The
quotation is partly from the syllabus (by the court) and partly from the opinion,
pp. 25 and 28.
5 But see Hare v.London etc. By. Co., 'saupra n. 1, and Simpson, op. cit., supra n. 1.
6 See to the same effect State ex rel.Snyder v. Portland Natural Gas and Oil Co.,
158 Ind. 483, 53 N. E. 1089 (1899): "It is an old and familiar maxim that competition
ij the life of trade, and whatever act destroys competition, or even relaxes it, upon
the part of those who sustain relations to the public, is regarded by the law as
injurious to public interests and is therefore deemed to be unlawful, on the grounds of
public policy."
7 See WYMAN, oP. cit., upra n. 1, §27-33 incl.
See also Holmes, J.,In Tyson
8 In Lochner v. New York. 198 U. S. 45, 76 (1905).
& Bro.-United Theatre Ticket Offices v. Banten, 47 Sup. Ct. Rep. 426, 433 and 484
(1927).
0 See POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW 195 if. (1921).
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Perhaps it should be parenthetically explained in passing
that while the phrase "public interests" strictly refers to
the interests of the state, either as a juristic person or as
guardian of the interests of society, 10 nevertheless, out of
deference to common usage, the phrase "public interests"
is herein used as including the interests of society generally,
i.e., social interests.
Quaere, then, can the policy of free competition in public
service be justified under our present-day legal theory and
Does the old policy of unrestricted
economic conditions?
competition secure today the more important "public interests" and sacrifice only the less important interests? It
is the purpose of this paper to attempt to prove that it
does not, and that accordingly the law of public utilities,
in furtherance of the end of law, 1 is today tending toward
a policy disfavoring unrestricted competition and favoring
regulated monopoly or, if promotion of "public interests"
requires it, favoring regulated competition. Thus, only a
a few days ago the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, showing a welcome change of front as to competition2
in public service, almost threw its old policy overboard.'
In holding that the statutory authorization of the State
Road Commission, which permitted competition between
two common carriers, did not conclusively give the new
utility a right to compete in such service, the court made
this highly important declaration :13
"The policy of the state as evidenced by the road law and
of the statutes relating to the public service commission,
its powers, and duties, is not to invite or encourage ruinous
competition between public carriers: on the contrary its
policy is to protect such public servants in the enjoyment
of their rights, so that the public may be served most effik' See POUND, OUTLINE OF A COURSE ON THE HISTORY AND SYSTEM OF THE COMMON
LAv, 4 (1919).
" The end of law today is,according to Dean Pound, to secure a maximum of
human wants or interests with a minimum sacrifice of other wants or interests, "to
satisfy social wants-the claims and demands involved in the existence of civilized
society-by giving effect to as much as we may with the least sacrifice, so far as such
wants may be satisfied or such claims given effect by an ordering of human conduct
through politically organized society." POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF
Law 59-99 (1922).
42 Reynolds Taxi Co. v. Hudson, 136 S. E. 833 (W. Va. 1927). The court actually
held that the orders of the Commission permitting competition are reviewable by
certiorari. The court was not called upon to hold that the commission was wrong in
permitting competition. But the court emphatically espoused the new policy.
Ibid., p. 885. Italics ours. See n. 12.
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ciently and economically, and by the best equipment reasonably necessary."
It is true that the West Virginia Court had made this
same declaration in a case decided in 1925,14 but in that
decision, the first edition 15 as it were, the new policy did
not display such possibilities as in the much more important
1927 edition. So far as this declaration of new policy goes,
it is, in general as we shall see, eminently sound. But it is
not altogether clear as to how far it actually goes. In the
first place,, does the new policy, as this declaration purports,
Or does it apply also to
apply only to public "carriers"?
public utilities generally? And in the second place, is the
new policy (1) a policy substituting regulated monopoly for
free competition, or is it (2) a policy substituting regulated
competition for free competition? Since there is some conflict of opinion as to whether the new policy shiould be (1)
or (2), it would seem worth while to consider (a) whether,
upon principle, the new policy should be (1) or (2), and
(b) whether, under the authorities including the West
Virginia cases, the recent tendency is to support (1) or
(2).
First, then, what should the new policy be? When two
or more public utilities, any one of which could properly
serve a given community, are competing to serve such community, if the law favors free competition, there is, to some
extent, a duplication (or perhaps a triplication or quadruplication) of investment, organization, and overhead expense. Now, normally a public utility under governmental
regulation is constitutionally entitled, after deducting
proper operating expense, to earn, if it can, a reasonable
return upon the fair "value" of its property devoted to public service, 16 and fair value generally includes prudent "investment."' 7 Therefore, if all the competing public utilities
U'Princeton Power Co. v. Calloway, 99 W. Va. 157, 128 S. E. 89 (1925).
13 Carson v. Woodrow. 95 W. Va. 197, 120 S. E. 512 (1923) seems to be the first
West Virginia case in point, but that decision 'contains no declaration of new policy.
1 Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466 (1898) ; Galveston Electric Co. v. Galveston, 258
U. S. 888 (1922).
A7 State of Mn.

x r47. Soutbweqt~rn Bell Telephone

Co.

v.

Public Service

Com-

misEcion of Mo., 262 U. S. 276. 308-309 (1923). Mr. Justice Brandeis says (Mr. Justice
Holmes concurring): "What is now termed the prudent investment Is, in essence, the
same thing as that which the court has always sought to protect in using the term
"pro3ent vale'." S-e Harrman, "Recent Developments in Regard to Rate Regulation,"
80 V. VA. L. Qua. 70 (1924).
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are permitted to realize such a reasonable return, it is
quite obvious tnat tne publc must pay more than if the
service was rendered by one regulated utility. Moreover,
in such cases the public will, in the long run, generally get
no betcer service and probably wili get worse service than
if the service was rendered by a single properly regulated
utility, tor the law requires a full-fledged 18 public utility to
render adequate service at reasonable rates, unless, of
course, there is a legal excuse for failure to serve adequately. Cut-throat competition may injure all the competing utilities to such an extent that all these utilities together cannot render proper service. 19 If all the utilities
cannot realize a reasonable return, then, since a public
20
utility cannot generally be compelled to operate at a loss,

one or more of them will, in the long run, as a rule at any
rate, either render inadequate service or discontinue service, or do both, having also, in all probability, greatly
damaged the property and service of the other utility or
utilities. 21 Consequently a service, which, by virtue of being a public service, is essential to the public welfare, 22 may
deteriorate in quality and cost the public more than if rendered by one regulated utility. Therefore, in such cases,
the important public interests in having adequate public
service and service at reasonable rates are by the policy of
free competition unduly sacrificed in order to secure the
less important individual interest of the competing utility,
and frequently without securing such individual interest.
Furthermore, to encourage this sort of competition is to
discourage, and often prevent, people from investing capital in public service business, or to induce withdrawal of
capital from such business. But to permit this is to fail
to secure the paramount public interest in having adequate
public service; for adequate public service requires ade' All businesses which are under some governmental regulation on the ground
that they are "affected with a public interest" cannot be said to be "full-fledged"
public utilities in the sense that they must render adequate service at reasonable rates.
See German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Kansas, 233 U. S. 389 (1914), and In re Opinion of
the Justices, 247 Mass. 589. 143 N. E. 808 (1924). Compare Tyson & Bros.-United
Theatre Ticket Offices, Inc. v. Banton, 47 Sup. Ct. Rep. 426 (1927).
Z5 See Choate v. Illinois Commerce Commission, 309 Ill.'248, 141 N. E. 12 (1923).
'o See Brooks-Scanlon Co. v. Railroad Commission of Louisiana, 251 U, S. 396
(1920), Notes, 37 HAV. L. Ray. 368 (1924).
21 See, e.g., Trescot Transfer Co. v. Sawyer, 136 S. E. 481 (S. C. 1927).
2 See my note, "What Constitutes a Public Service," 26 W. VA. L. QUAn. 140
(1920).
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quate capital invested and available for investment.
Therefore, the law must protect investors in public utility
enterprises from losses likely to result from unreasonable
competition.

23

Finally, free competition is not necessary today in order
to secure proper public service, for today public service
commissions require full-fledged public utilities 24 to render
adequate service for reasonable compensation. Of course,
at common law public utilities were subjected to considerable court control, e.g., a full-fledged public utility, such as a
common carrier, could not charge unreasonable rates. But
the legal (largely common-law) control of a few years ago
was neither so rigorous nor so far reaching as the. commonlaw control and the legislative and administrative regulation of public utilities today. When the American common
law put its condemnation on "monopolies" in general, the
somewhat uncertain condition of the law of public utilitids
seems to have prevented our courts from seeing that, in
fact, the law of public utilities, by requiring adequate service at reasonable rates, could have prevented the usual
evils of monopoly and at the same time have retained its
many above-mentioned advantages. 25 But today, as has
been intimated, the law of public utilities, mainly through
public service commissions, effectively requires full-fledged
public utilities to render adequate service at reasonable
rates. Hence, if there was any reason for the principle of
free competition in public service in those days, that reason
has ceased, and under the time-honored common-law doctrine of cessante ratione cessat et ipsa lex,20 the reason for
this principle having ceased, the principle itself should
cease, since the principle, if applied today, would not secure
the more important interests and sacrifice Only the less
important interests and therefore would not promote the
true purpose of law. Accordingly, partly under this commonlaw doctrine and partly in furtherance of legislation, many
courts, in recent years, are beginning to change the prin-

" See Re Portland Taxicab Co.

(Me. P. U. Corn.). P. U. R. 1923E. 772, 780.

See n. 18, supra.
25 Cf. 2 MOnAvETZ, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
28

(2nd ed.), §1131 (1886).
2a See 2 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 390, 391 (4th
ed. 1770).
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ciple or policy applicable to such public utility cases. 27 Thus,
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in Upholding an agreement
between two competing telephone companies not to compete, said, per Winslow, C. J. (concurring) :28
"The policy of this state, as evidenced by the public
utilities act, contemplates * * * * * situations where the
public will be served by one public utility to the exclusion of competing companies of the same kind, and
where the ordinary effects of such a monopoly, to-wit,
the raising of rates of service to excessive figures, will be
prevented by the utilities commission. The idea of the
law is that monopoly so regulated is preferable to ruinous competition * * * * *. In my judgment the public
utilities law changed the policy of the state with reference to competition between utilities of this kind."
Similarly, Siebecker, J., in the principal opinion, said :29
"The objects of the contract are in harmony with the
policy of the state, embodied in the legislative regulations
of public utilities, namely, that the public welfare as regards these enterprises is best promoted through such
means as affords the highest practical efficiency at the
lowest cost, and that this may be best accomplished by
uniting existing facilities, under proper control and regulation, to meet the public convenience and necessity,
having regard for existing property interests and the
rights and privileges appertaining thereto."
Many states, including West Virginia, require that certain
common carriers shall, before starting to serve a given community, secure from some authorized administrative officer a
certificate of convenience,3 0 i.e., a certificate to the general
effect that public convenience reasonably requires such service. It is true that the cases illustrating the new policy generally involve an application of these statutes, though the
Wisconsin Case just discussed does not involve such a statute. But in some jurisdictions, not including West Virginia, 3 '
In addition to the West Virginia cases cited, supra, see Logan County Bus Co.
w. Ellis, 100 W. Va. 32, 129 S. E. 751 (1925) ; Pocahontas Transportation Co. v. Craft,
10 W. Va. 240, 1380 S. E. 468 (1925). See collecting and discussing some of the
cases on this question, Ingram and Breckenridge, "Motor Bus Competition with Established Carriers," 9 IowA. L. BULLETIN 268 (1924); Note, "Policy as to Competition
between Utilities." 24 MIcH. L. REv. 393 (1926).
is McKinley Telephone Co. v. Cumberland Telephone Co.. 152 Wis. 859, 140 N. W.
88 (1913).
'

Ibid.

Acts of West Virginia 1926, c. 17, §82.
W. VA. CobB 1923, c. 54B.
" Thdi&

See also as to "waterpower" companies,
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the requirement of certificates of public convenience extends to public utilities generally.3 2 And, in general, the same
principle applies, to a greater or less degree, to all public
utilities. But it remains to be seen how far the new policy
will be applied in the absence of some such statutory requirement or declaration of policy.
As we have seen the new declaration of policy in West
Virginia purports to apply to "public carriers."8 3 And this
is true in some other states. But this implied limitation, so
far as it is a limitation, may be explained, in part at least,
on the ground that the cases involved were dealing only
with "carriers," and as every lawyer knows the courts
generally state their reasoning with reference to the facts
of the particular case, deciding no more than it is necessary
to decide. In this connection it is worth noting that the
West Virginia statute does not require a certificate of convenience for all public carriers; yet the declaration of new
policy purports to apply to all "public carriers," though perhaps other parts of the opinion 4 limit its application to
some carriers only. Quaere, then, where the statutory certificate of convenience is required only in case of public
carriers, or some public carriers, and there is no other
statutorydeclaration of policy, does the new policy apply,
in proper cases, to public utilities generally?
For example, a West Virginia statute requires that
"water power" electric companies, 'before condemning
easements and rights of way, shall get a "permit" from the
public service commission.3 5 Such a "permit" is not exactly
the same as the certificate of public convenience required in
case of carriers.3 6 But the commission has a wide discre" See "Current Legislation," 24 COL. L. REV. 628
ing on the statutes.

(1924),

collecting

and comment-

Reynolds Taxi Co. v. Hudson, supra n. 12.
Reynolds Taxi Co. v. Hudson, supra n. 12.

86 Ibid.

.And see Princeton Power Co. v. Calloway,

supra n. 14.

0 W. VA. CODE 1923, c. 54B, §§3, 8, 17, 18, 22. Section 8. empowers hydro.
electric companies "to acquire by condemnation, within the limits only of the territory
designated by the public service commission, the necessary land for * * * * transmission
lines." Section 8 provides: "Such corporations shall have the right and authority to
acquire by condemnation, within the limits only of the territory designated by the
public service commission, easements, ways, and rights of way * * * * * * upon
which to erect towers, poles or wire lines for the transmission, supply and sale of
electrical or other energy or power produced by water as a motive force or by steam
power or otherwise." Section 17 provides: "Before such corporation shall exercise any
of the powers herein authorized * * * * the permit provided for in section three
"shall he obtained from the public service commission."
As to certificates of public convenience see
" It is, however, much the same.
Acta of W. Va. 1925, c. 17, §82, class H.
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tion in granting or refusing such permits.3 7 Suppose,
then, that the community which a new hydro-electric company wishes to serve is already adequately served at reasonable rates and that the established electric utility can
continue to render adequate service at reasonable rates.
Should the new hydro-electric utility (in the absence of
unequivocal legislative authority) be allowed to condemn a
right of way to such community for the purpose of- competing with the established utility? Under the old policy
favoring free competition, yes. For, as we have seen, vigorous competition, rather than monopoly, was supposed to
promote the great "public interests." And the courts
might so hold today; for the new declaration of policy purports to apply only to "public carriers" where a "certificate of convenience" is required, and such hydro-electric
company is not a public carrier, and, as has been seen, the
required "permit" is not exactly the same as a certificate
of convenience. Nevertheless, it is submitted that (in the
absence of other possible facts hereinafter discussed) the
new policy should be applied to such a case. For, as has
been shown, the public interests involved in such cases are
more efficiently and economically secured by regulated
monopoly than by free competition. Surely, the law cannot
justify condemning private property, which can be done
only "for public use," if such condemnation is injurious to
the public as well as to the private owner. The only reason
why the law permits condemnation of private property is
that the public will be benefitted thereby. As the Supreme
Court of Appeals of West Virginia said in a leading case, 38
in order to condemn private property it must be shown that
the "public use" for which the property is to be condemned
is "clearly a needful one for the public, one which cannot
be given up without obvious general loss and inconvenience." Therefore, the commission should not grant a "permit" to the new hydro-electric company to condemn property in order to compete with such established utility. And
if the commission should grant a permit under such circumstances then it would seem that by analogy to the latest
West Virginia case such authorization of -"ruinous competi-

a

See W. VA. Cmnu. 1923,. . 849. particularly H17. 18 and 22.
In Varner v. MIartin, 21 W. Va. 634, 56 (1883).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1927

9

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 3 [1927], Art. 2
WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY

tion" should be reversed by the court on the ground that it
is unreasonable and contrary to the now recognized policy
of the state to protect public utilities and the public against
such competition as is detrimental to the public welfare.
If the new electric'company is not a "water power" company and therefore is not required to secure such a "permit" before condemning property, the question of its right
to condemn in such a case is more doubtful; for in such
cases the West Virginia statute in very general language
provides, that "private property may be taken * * * for
electric light companies * * * * when for public use."30 But
in the light of the latest declarations of policy it would
seem that, in the absence of specific legislative authority,
such a utility should not be allowed to cond'emn in such a
case. For, as intimated, the only reason why the law permits private property to be taken by condemnation is that
the promotion of public interests requires that the individual interest of the property owner be sacrificed for the
public good. But in this case, as has been shown, the
public good will be better promoted by having the community served by one regulated utility rather than by two
competing utilities. Therefore, since the applicable legislation simply says that private property "may be taken * * *
[for such a company] when for public use," 40 such general
legislation should not be interpreted as authorizing a taking
when, as in this case, the taking will be injurious to the public
as well as to the private owner, for the only justification for
condemnation is completely lacking. Such an interpretation
does no violence to the language of the statute, but, by an application of a judicially and legislatively recognized principle
against ruinous competition and by an application of the
principle justifying condemnation, such an interpretation
reaches the. more desirable result.
Hence, it would seem that in proper cases the new policy
should be applied to public utilities generally even in the
absence of a requirement of a certificate of convenience or
other statutory intimation of policy. What is a "proper
case" should depend on whether an application of the
W. VA. CODE 1928. e. 42. §2.
Ibid.
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new policy would secure the important public interests better than an application of the old policy. If, for example,
the established utility is using an expensive method of
generating electrical energy, and there is, as a practical
matter, no less expensive method available for the local
utility, and the new utility seeking to compete is generating
electrical energy in large quantities by water power and
much more cheaply than the local utility can, it would
seem, on first thought at least, that generally competition
should be permitted in the interest of the public. But it is
submitted that here the new policy should take the form
of allowing the local utility to compel the new hydroelectric utility to wholesale electrical energy to the established utility for distribution to the public, provided that
the new utility is holding itself out to serve the public
through some distributing utility. There is a difference of
opinion among the few authorities touching upon the last
question, but the view supported by the better cases and by
the better reasoning is that such a generating utility supplying electrical energy at wholesale to a distributing public
utility is performing a public service subject to the regulations of the public service commissions. 41 It would seem
that supplying electricity directly to the public is a different
class of service from supplying electricity to a public utility
for distribution to the public, 42 and, if so, such a generating
utility could not, generally speaking, be thus compelled to
wholesale for retail unless it holds itself out to render that
class of service to some distributing utility. But if it holds
itself out to render that class of service to one distributing
utility, it is holding itself out to the public through a distributing utility and it must not discriminate against another
public utility similarly situated and demanding similar serCompany v. Southern Power Co., 272 Fed.
4' See North Carolina Public Service
837 (1922); Southern Oklahoma Power Co. v. Corporation Commission, 96 Okla. 63,
220 Pac. 370 (1923) ; Acker, Merrall & Condit Co. v. N. Y. Edison Co., P. U. R. 1919B,
272 (N. Y. P. S. C. 1st Dist. 1918); North Carolina Public Service Company etc. v.
Southern Power Co., 179 N. C. 18, 101 S. E. 593 (1919) ; North Carolina Public Service
Co. etc. v. Southern Power Co., 179 N. C. 330, 102 S. E. 625 (1920); Salisbury and
Spencer By. Co. etc. v. Southern Power Co., 180 N. C. 422, 105 S. E. 28 (1920) ;
Public Service Commission of W. Va., Rate Circular No. 2 (1924) pp. 68, 69. Compare
Morgantown et a. v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 1 Decisions Public Service Commission of
W. va. 556 (1919) ; Peoples Natural Gas Co. v. Public Service Commission, 79 Pa.
Superior Ct. 560 (1922) ; In re United Fuel Gas Co. Public Service Commission of
W. Va., Bulletin No. 91 (1925), not unanimous. But see Southern Ohio Power Co. v.
Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, 110 Oh. St. 246; 143 N. E. 700 (1924) ; Colorado
Power Co. v. Halderman, 295 Fed. 178 (1924).
4' See North Carolina Public Service Co. v. Southern Power Co.. 179 N. C. 330, 333,
102 S. E. 625 (1920).
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vice for the public. 43 In this way by preventing competition
there will be no duplication of equipment in the community
already served, the streets will not be torn up and cluttered
up with two sets of poles and wiresto the injury of important public interests, and the service will be rendered more
economically. The generating utility will be entitled to
reasonable compensation for service supplied, and at the
same time the public interest in protecting the established
utility which is required to serve the public properly is
adequately secured. Thus, a policy of regulated monopoly rather than of free competition would here secure the
important public interest in having adequate service at
reasonable rates, and at the same time would adequately
secure the interests of both utilities.
Perhaps there is no better case to illustrate this problem
than the decision of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia in Clarksburg Electric Light Company v. City of
Clarksburg." In that case the municipality of Clarksburg
had granted to the Clarksburg Electric Light Company
an exclusive franchise to use the municipality's streets
for twenty years for transmitting electricity for public
use in the municipality. Within the twenty year period
the Clarksburg Electric Light Company sought to enjoin a competing electric company from applying to the
council of Clarksburg for a franchise to supply the same
community and to enjoin the municipality from granting a
franchise to the competing utility. The municipality had
legislatively granted power to "control" the streets and
light the same. This admittedly gave the municipality
power to grant a franchise to an electric company to use
the city streets for poles, etc., but the question was, should
the grant of power be construed to include power to "control" the streets by giving to a public utility an exclusive
franchise to use the streets for this purpose. The court
held that this grant of power could not be so construed, for
the reason that "such franchises constitute monopolies,
which the law has through the ages condemned, because
4 See generally the authorities cited In note 41, supra. except the two caas
last
eite3. See particularly the case referred to in note 42, eupra, and authorities therein
cite.
. 47 W. Va. 789, 85 S. E. 994 (1900).
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they tie down and restrain and cripple the public right and
interest, and sacrifice great public interests to the benefit
45
and aggrandizement of the few."
It is thus obvious that the question whether such a grant
of power shall be construed to authorize an exclusive use
of the streets by a public utility depends primarily upon
the question whether the law adopts a policy favoring free
competition or a policy favoring regulated monopoly in
such public service. Accordingly, it is submitted that the
case, though supported by the generally accepted view, 4
should be decided contra today, and should be decided contra
for the very reason which the court uses to support its
decision, viz., that competing electric companies using the
same streets rather than only one utility so using them,
would, in the language of the court, "sacrifice great public
interests to the benefit and aggrandizement of the few."
For reasons already shown, a well regulated monopoly,
under present conditions, would better secure the "great
public interests" in having proper public service at reasonable rates. Then, too, the public interest in not having
the streets unnecessarily obstructed with two or more sets
of electric light poles, conduits or other equipment is entitled to much weight. Therefore, it would seem that where
one public utility can adequately serve the community, the
"'great public interests" are best secured by holding that
the power to "control" the streets should be construed to
mean power to control the streets by providing that only
one regulated public utility can obstruct the streets for the
purpose of serving the people of the municipality.'
Similarly, it is generally held that agreements between
48
public utilities to pool their earnings, 47 or not to compete,
are not enforceable, because, as the cases say, such agreements are contrary to the policy of free competition, or,
as it is often put, aire contrary to public policy. But it is
obvious that here too the reasons for the new policy apply
with special force, for the additional reason that the "other"
"Thid., at p. 742.

'3See Gas Company v. Parkersburg. 30 W. Va. 435; 4 S. E. 650 (1887) ; 3 DILL N.

MUNICIPAL

CORPORATIONS, (6th ed.) §§1215-1219 (1911).
1 WYMAN, PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATIONS §694 (1911).

"1

Se

"

See 1 WYMAN,

oP. cit., SUpra n. 47, §§693, 694.
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competitor is not complaining. Accordingly, some decisions have recognized the validity of such agreements in
proper cases of this sort. 49 And it may perhaps be prophesied with considerable assurance that the law of the
future will tend to abandon the policy of free competition
50
in this class of cases.
It would seem then that, in the absence of clear legislative provision to the contrary, the law may "imply" a limitation on the policy of free competition in all cases in
which a policy restricting competition will better serve the
"public interests." But how far should competition be
restricted? Will a policy of regulated monopoly rather
than a policy of regulated competition better serve the most
important interests? It seems to the writer that the new
policy is neither the one nor the other exclusively. It is
rather that composite of the two policies which will best
secure the .public interests in having proper public service
at reasonable rates without unreasonably sacrificing the
individual interests of the utilities and the public interest in
securing such individual interests. To illustrate, where
one established utility without competition is rendering adequate service at reasonable rates and can continue to do so,
a policy of regulated monopoly: will, for reasons already
stated, best secure the most important interests. Similarly,
where the one established utility is not rendering such
service but under proper regulation (e.g., administrative regulation requiring proper extension of service) such utility
can be expected to render such service. Likewise, where
there is no established utility and two or more competing
utilities are simultaneously seeking certificates of convenience or other state-granted authority, if one can serve the
community properly and at reasonable rates, only onethe one more likely to render the more satisfactory service
-should be authorized; if all applicants are equally likely
to render such service, the equities being equal as it were,
it would seem that priority of application should govern.
But where for any reason it appears that one utility, e.g., an
See. e.g., McKinley Telephone Co. v. Cumberland Telephone Co., supra n. 28.
The Federal Transportation Act of 1920 adopts the new policy In certain
respects. See note, 24 MICH. L. REV. 393, 397 (1926) discussing some of these questions.
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established utility, cannot, under governmental regulation,
be depended upon to render adequate service at reasonable
rates, then the public interests will generally be better
secured by a policy of regulated competition. In other
words the new policy should in general simply substitute
for the old r6gime of free competition such regulation as
will best secure the paramount public interest in having
proper public service at reasonable rates without unreas51
onably sacrificing the interests of any established utility.
And in the main the courts and commissions, so far as they
have passed on this question, seem to have refrained from
tying themselves down to any inflexible interpretation of the
recent policy.
The above quoted declaration of new policy by the West
52
The court says that
Virginia Court is a typical example.
the new policy is "not" to "encourage ruinous competition. ' '5 3 May this, in the light of the theretofore recognized
policy encouraging competition, be interpreted as a policy
encouraging competition short of "ruinous competition"?
In general it would seem not, for the court goes on to say
that "its policy is to protect such public servants * * * *
so that the public may be served most efficiently and eco54
nomically, and by the best equipment reasonably necessary.
And this sort of protection involves protection against unreasonable competition. It also involves protection against
any competition when the public interests in efficient and
economical public service are best served by regulated
monopoly, unless there is some more important interest to
the contrary. But is this protection primarily a protection
of the interests of the utility or is it primarily a protection
of the interests of the public in having adequate efficient
and economical public service?
Though there is a somewhat earlier case on the question
in West Virginia,5 5 the earliest specific declaration of new
policy was enunciated in Princeton Power Company v. Callo31Cf.

Siebeeker,

su1ra n. 28.

CS Reynolds

J., in McKinley Telephone

Co. v.

Cumberland Telephone Co.,

Taxi Co. v. Hudson, supra n. 12.

Ibid.
'

Ibid. Italics ours.
Carson v. Woodram, 95 W. Va. 197, 120 S. E. 512 (1923).
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way.56 In that case, the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals, reversing the circuit court, held that an electric
railway, adequately serving the public along its line, may
enjoin owners of taxicabs from operating them regularly
over the public road paralleling the railway and soliciting
business along the route. It is true that the owners of the
taxicabs had licenses from the State Road Commission only
to operate their cars for hire and had no permit authorizing them to operate their cars over the regular route between fixed termini. It is also true that the statute provides
that no such permit shall be issued until it shall be established to the satisfaction of the commission that the privilege is necessary or convenient for the public and that this
service is not being adequately performed by any other
person. But under a proper interpretation of the new
policy might not the same conclusion be reached even if the
statute did not require such a permit? The emphasis of
the court's general argument seems to be largely, if not primarily, that the new policy is to protect the established
utilities "in the enjoyment of their rights" and that until the
competing utility got authority from the commission to compete, the "rights ' of the established utilities were to be protected against "unauthorized" competition. It is submitted,
with great deference, that, to this extent, this interpretation of the new policy tends to put the primary emphasis on
the wrong thing. The chief purpose of the new policy is
to protect the paramount public interest in having proper
public service at reasonable rates, and to protect the public
utilities "in the enjoyment of their rights" so far as such
protection adequately secures the more important public
interests. As the Supreme Court of Illinois recently said
7
on this point:1
"It is not the policy of the Public Utilities Act to promote competition between common carriers as a means
of providing service to the public. The policy established
by that act is that, through regulation of an established
carrier occupying a given field and protecting it from
competition it may be able to serve the public more efficiently and at a more reasonable rate than would be the
88 99 W. Va. 167, 128 S. E. 89 (1925).
Wcst Suburban Transportation Co. v. Chicago and West Towns Ry. Co., 809 In.
87, 91-92, 140 W. E. 56 (1923).
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case if other competing lines were authorized to serve
the public in the same territory."
Moreover, that this latter interpretation of the new policy
is the correct interpretation is strikingly emphasized in the
latest adjudication of the West Virginia Court.58 In that
case, as has been intimated in part, the State Road Commission had granted a certificate of public convenience to
a new utility rather than to a utility organized by the established utility. But the Supreme Court of Appeals held
that such a state-granted certificate of convenience authorizing competition is not conclusive as to whether such competition is legally permissible. In other words, if the public interests in having efficient public service rendered most
"economically and by the best equipment reasonably necessary" and the public interest in protecting the established
utility will be better served by preventing such competition, the administrative determination that such competition is desirable is not conclusive. Courts are, and should
be, extremely reluctant to go behind administrative determinations of fact-here the finding of fact that public convenience and necessity justified granting the certificate to a
competitor of the established utility. Therefore, the decision is highly important in showing that the courts are
willing to go to great lengths in promoting the now recognized important public interest in preventing unreasonable
competition between public utilities.
The Supreme Court of Ohio has recently reached substantially the same conclusion in the case of Cincinnati Traction Company v. Public Utilities Company of Ohio.59 In that
case the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio had granted a
certificate of public convenience and necessity to a competing. utility to operate motor transportation service over
a route that was already adequately served by other utilities. The court reviewed the evidence upon which the
Commission acted and refused to sanction such unreasonable competition.
A more interesting application of the modern policy is
found in Chicago Motor Bus Company v. Chicago Stage
" Reynolds Taxi Co. v. Hudson, supra n. 12.
89112 Oh. St. 699. 148 X. E. 921 (1926).
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Company.60 In that case an established motor transportation
company had been satisfactorily serving certain sections of
Chicago and had spent considerable money in developing
its service. The state public utilities commission issued a
certificate of convenience and necessity for similar service
in other parts of the city to a new utility rather than to the
old utility. On appeal the Supreme Court of Illinois held
that, as there was no showing that the new competing
utility was in a position to render better service to the public
than the old one, the action of the commission must be
reversed. Said the court: 6
"It seems obvious to us that in view of the fact that
appellant had been so long in the field, had spent large
sums of money in securing the right to operate and in
developing its business, as against the Chicago Stage
Company, which had just come into existence and had
spent no money in the enterprise, the former should in
all justice be entitled to the preference unless the public
interests would be best served by the latter company."
The italicized phrase admirably shows where the emphasis properly lies in such cases. The true criterion is
whether, under governmental regulation, one utility alone
or whether two or more competing utilities .will better serve
the "public interests," not only the public interests in having proper public service at reasonable rates but the public
interest in adequately protecting the individual interests of
the utilities. And, in general, as we have seen the' public
interests will be better served by one regulated utility
without competition. But where for any reason it appears
that one utility cannot be relied upon, under governmental
regulation, to serve the community properly, it is obvious
that, in general, a policy of regulated competition, rather
than a policy of regulated monopoly, would be better, unless it further appears that two or more competing utilities
could not be relied upon to render adequate service at
reasonable rates and that one regulated utility without
competition would serve the community better than two or
more competing utilities.
Of course, where there are two or more competing utili- 287 Ill. 320, 122 N.

01 Ibid., p. 328.

E.

477 (1919).

Italics ours.
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ties already in the field and one could render the service
better than all combined, the new policy does not necessarily or even ordinarily mean that all but one must be discontinued either in whole or in part, because the public interest in protecting the individual interest of the other utility
or utilities might outweigh the public interest in having
better public service. In other words, a policy of regulated
competition should often be applied. This would be particularly true, as a general rule, in regard to such public utilities as railroads where, as a practical matter, much of the
plant could not be used for other purposes. But in some
cases a contrary conclusion should be reached. For example, suppose that two competing railroads that cannot
survive in competition contract to combine. Or suppose
that two rival bus lines simultaneously started, before the
days of certificates of convenience, to transport between
fixed termini. And it now appears that one bus is all that
is needed adequately to serve the public between those
points. What should be done? To continue such competition would, in the long run, generally deteriorate the
public service and ruin the competing public utilities. When
certificates of convenience are sought for the first time, it
would seem that the commission should grant a certificate
to only one of these bus lines, viz., the one which appeared
the more likely to render the better service, or, if this could
not be determined, the equities being equal, priority of
application, it would seem, should govern. 62 A policy of
regulated monopoly would better secure the more important interests. Most of the property of the other utility
could, as a practical matter, be used for other purposes,
so that the individual interest of the other utility and the
public interest in protecting that individual interest, would
not, as -in the average railroad case, outweigh the public interest in having more efficient and economical public service.
But suppose that the commission has granted certificates
of convenience to each of the utilities to operate for five
years. What can be done to protect the public interest
against "ruinous competition"?
Where a statute provides,

63Cf.

Chicago Motor Bus Co. v. Chicago State Co..

-pra. n. 60.
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as tle West Virginia statute provides 3 that the "commission shall have the power to issue any certificate of convenience for such length of time not in excess of five years
as in its judgment the service proposed and the capital to
be invested in such proposed service may justify," it would
seem that ordinarily, instead of adopting a policy of regulated monopoly, the law must, until the end of the legislatively and administratively authorized period, generally
apply a policy of regulated competition. But a policy of
:regulated monopoly should be applied to an agreement not
to compete in the form of one utility agreeing to withdraw.
Also, if at the time of granting such certificates, it was
clear that public convenience would be better served by
only one utility, then, under some decisions including the
latest West Virginia decision,6 4 perhaps it should be held
that the action of the commission in granting certificates to
more than one utility was unreasonable and therefore
should be reversed. For otherwise the law would be securing the comparatively less important individual interest
of the utility (and perhaps not that) and the comparatively
less important public interest, if any, in securing such individual interest and, in so doing, would be sacrificing the
paramount public interest in having public service rendered,
as the West Virginia Court expressed it, "most efficiently
and economically
and by the best equipment reasonably
65

-necessary."

To sum up, the recent trend of judicial, administrative
and legislative66 - opinion seems to be, broadly speaking, to
abandon the policy of free competition in public service and
to substitute a policy of regulated monopoly or a policy of
regulated competition where it appears that the latter rather than the former would better secure the "public interest" in
having proper public service and the "public interest" in
reasonably protecting the individual interests of competing
utilities. If the private interests of a competitor or wouldbe competitor do not promote these paramount public in" Acts of West Virginia. 1925. c. 17, §82, Class H. There is a proviso as to
vehicles not operated "over a regular route or between fixed termini, or having a
regular time schedule."
,R"tvnolds Taxi Co. v. Hudson, eupre n. 12.
1hd.
I.
O;See "Current Legislation," 24 Cot. L. REv. 528 (1924).
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terests, then, to the extent that such private interests are
outweighed by the public interests, such interests should be
sacrificed for the public good. Only thus will the true
end of law, to secure a maximum of interests with a minimum sacrifice of other interests, be adequately subserved.
Only thus will there be proper progress in public service.
And as the United States Supreme Court has admirably
said :67
"There must be progress, and if in its march private
interests are in the way they must yield to the good of
the community."
" Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 289 U. S. 894, 410 (1915).
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